University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2020

Ship-Money: The Case that Time and Whittington Forgot
Mark A. Graber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Graber, Mark A., "Ship-Money: The Case that Time and Whittington Forgot" (2020). Constitutional
Commentary. 1200.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1200

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Constitutional Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

35.1 GRABER

6/19/2020 11:55 AM

SHIP-MONEY: THE CASE THAT TIME AND
WHITTINGTON FORGOT
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.1 University Press of
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth).
Mark A. Graber2
King Charles I, when asking the King’s Bench for an opinion
on whether the king during an emergency could insist that all
communities in England supply the Royal Navy with a ship or the
money necessary to build a ship,3 set in motion a process that
delayed the development of judicial review in the Englishspeaking world for more than a century. The King’s Bench
informed the King that he had the power to levy that exaction.4
Several years later, in the Ship Money Case or The King v.
Hampden, the justices by an 8–4 vote declared the levy
constitutional. Three justices issued opinions quite clearly
affirming judicial power to strike down any Parliamentary statute
that trenched on the royal prerogative. Neither that decision nor
the assertions of judicial power proved lasting in England or the
United Kingdom. When Parliament reconvened in 1640, the Ship
Money decision was condemned.5 During the English Civil War,
the surviving justices in the majority who did not flee the realm
were imprisoned.6 By the end of the seventeenth century,
parliamentary supremacy was becoming the law of the land.
Aided by Blackstone’s Commentaries, commentators soon
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.
See The King v. Hampdon (1637) 3, HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 825, 844 (U.K.).
See id. at 844.
See id. at 1261, 1299.
For the information in this paragraph, see W. J. JONES, POLITICS AND THE
BENCH: THE JUDGES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (1971); STUART E.
PRALL, BOOK REVIEW, 78 THE AM. HIST. REV. 432 (1973).
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forgot the political struggles over the judiciary in the seventeenth
century that placed England on the course of parliamentary
supremacy. When scholars look for the English origins of judicial
review, they debate the significance of Dr. Bonham’s Case.7 ShipMoney is almost entirely absent from the judicial review canon,
even from works as magnificently encyclopedic as Keith
Whittington’s Repugnant Laws: Judicial Review of Acts of
Congress from the Founding to the Present.8 Repugnant Laws tells
the conventional story of the rise of judicial power in the United
States. Professor Keith Whittington goes directly from Bonham
to the late 1760s, when some colonialists claimed that courts
should declare unconstitutional laws permitting English
authorities to use general warrants and when William Blackstone
published Commentaries on the Laws of England,9 the second
volume of which maintained that courts had no power to declare
laws unconstitutional (p. 40). The English Civil War had a great
impact on King Charles I’s head, but apparently none on judicial
power.
Whittington’s failure to mention Ship-Money in his
magisterial Repugnant Laws highlights the present obscurity of
the case. Whittington, when writing Repugnant Laws, performed
Herculean research tasks. He read and synthesized every case in
which the Supreme Court of the United States considered
declaring unconstitutional a federal law. The text comments on
the Supreme Court’s greatest hits and on every federal
constitutional matter in which a justice ever hit a note. Repugnant
Laws discusses Marbury v. Madison10 (pp. 80–82), as well as scores
of other cases, such as Pollard v. Hagan11 (pp. 98–100), that
escaped the notice of almost all scholars previous to Whittington.
This is not simply an exercise in judicial trivial pursuit.
Whittington demonstrates such cases as Hagan play as vital role
in understanding the development and role of judicial review as
Marbury. If Ship-Money is missing from this study, that case and

7. 77 ENG. REP. 646 (C.P. 1610). For the debates over the significance of Bonham’s
Case, see especially, R. M. Helmholtz, Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review and the Law of
Nature, 1 J.LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 326 note 3 (2009) (citing numerous sources discussing
Bonham and the origins of judicial review).
8. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF
CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT (2019).
9. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1979).
10. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
11. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
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the surrounding constitutional politics are likely to be absent from
any history of judicial review in the English-speaking world, past,
present, or future.
This Review employs a bait and switch strategy for restoring
Ship-Money to the canon on judicial review that Whittington so
lovingly fills out with respect to the United States. The bait is an
alleged review of a seminal manuscript by one of the most
prominent constitutional scholars in the academy. The switch is a
focus on a neglected case in the English canon of judicial power
rather than a discussion of what Whittington has to say about the
canon in the United States. This bait and switch strategy is
justified by the sheer impossibility of saying anything new or
particularly interesting about the history of judicial review that
Whittington has not covered.
Repugnant Laws is immune to the standard review critique.
The review of cases is dimensionally more comprehensive than
has ever occurred before. One might tinker at the margins with a
case or theme here and there, but any proposed addition,
subtraction, or modification is likely to take place at least six
points to the right of the decimal place. Historical institutionalists
can add little to Repugnant Laws’ central thesis, that one cannot
understand the work of the Supreme Court without a deep
engagement with the law and politics of the time. This
understanding that judicial review is politically constructed is
becoming increasingly important in both political science
departments and law schools.12 Repugnant Laws documents how
courts are political institutions. Whittington writes:
The Court has not stood apart from the forces that move
American politics generally. The justices swim in the same
political waters as other federal government officials. The
Court acts within bounds set by other political actors, and it
acts on goals shared by its political allies (p. 287).

Repugnant Laws details how the Supreme Court is a distinctive
political institution that does not merely reproduce the rest of the
political order. Whittington observes,
The justices . . . are not minions who simply do the bidding of
party leaders. They are allies of coalitional leaders, not their
agents . . . . [Their] commitments may well be shared by others,
12. For one review of the literature, see Mark A. Graber, The Collapse of the New
Deal Conceptual Universe: The Schmooze Project, 77 MD. L. REV. 108, 121–25 (2017).
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and they may be advanced through party platforms and
legislative debates, but the justices give them shape and
effectiveness. The justices set their own priorities and, in many
cases, have their own distinctive set of concerns (pp. 288–89).

Whether any scholar could state these points more clearly or
defend them with more vigor and elbow grease is doubtful. For
this reason, the better reviewing strategy is to make this barely
adequate feint in Whittington’s direction and then use the body
of the review to discuss a related subject of interest to the
reviewer.
The absence of Ship-Money from the canon of judicial review
creates a lacuna in the scholarship on the theoretical foundations
for judicial review. Part I of this Review briefly covers the facts of
Ship-Money, the holding of the case, the majority opinions clearly
asserting a judicial power to declare unconstitutional
parliamentary laws, and the dissenting opinions clearly asserting
a judicial power to declare illegal royal proclamations. Part II of
this Review details how those majority and dissenting opinions
provided Americans with two distinctive paths to a judicial power
to declare laws unconstitutional. The majority opinions
emphasized sovereignty. Judicial review serves to protect the will
of the sovereign, be that the King, Parliament, or the people. The
dissents emphasized fundamental law. Judicial review serves to
protect higher law principles. Marbury grounded judicial review
in a theory of sovereignty. James Otis, when protesting the Stamp
Act13, grounded judicial review in higher law principles. Both
approaches intertwine in American constitutional development.
The absence of Ship-Money from the canon of judicial review
creates a lacuna in the scholarship on the political construction of
judicial review. Increasing agreement exists among scholars of
constitutional law in the United States that judicial review has
political foundations and is not the countermajoritarian
institution that Alexander Bickel and other scholars obsessed
about in the late twentieth century.14 Ran Hirschl and Tom
Ginsburg detail how the judicialization of politics outside the
United States has similar political foundations.15 Talk of politics
13.
14

Public Act, 5 George III, c. 12.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
15. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL
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disappears, however, when conversation turns to the rise of
parliamentary sovereignty in England. Repugnant Laws and other
distinguished histories begin with Bonham’s Case, which scholars
discuss as an intervention in the theory of judicial power. The
English path ends with Blackstone declaring that courts have no
power to declare laws unconstitutional. Parliamentary
sovereignty appears to have just happened in England, or
Bonham perhaps aside, been the rule from time immemorial. No
politics here.
Ship-Money puts politics back into explanations for the rise
of parliamentary sovereignty in England and the later rise of
judicial power in the United States. The judicial opinions in ShipMoney demonstrate that judicial elites in the mid-seventeenth
century had developed a conception of judicial power rooted in
royal sovereignty that justified striking down parliamentary
legislation inconsistent with royal prerogatives. Part III of this
Essay explains why this conception of judicial power did not take
hold in England. The political foundations of Ship-Money judicial
review collapsed almost immediately. The judicial majority in
Ship-Money placed the courts firmly on what would become,
within a decade, the losing side of the English Civil War, when
asserting that sovereignty was vested in the King, that one aspect
of this sovereignty was royal power to levy exactions without
parliamentary consent, and that laws that trenched on this regal
prerogative were void. Institutional power after 1648 and 1688
flowed to Parliament, the institution on the winning side of the
English revolution. The new understanding of judicial power,
celebrated by Blackstone, maintained that courts could not strike
down legislation because Parliament was sovereign, but that
justices could declare illegal Royal decrees inconsistent with
parliamentary sovereignty. Ultra vires judicial power and only
ultra vires judicial power does not date from “time immemorial,”
but became during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries the dominant philosophy of the members of Parliament
who gained power after the English Civil War and the Glorious
Revolution.
John Marshall learned well the lesson Ship-Money taught
about judicial capacity to intervene in bitter political disputes.
Marshall in Marbury and in other cases avoided making decisions
REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003).
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that unduly antagonized the dominant national coalition.16
Marshall might have engaged in considerable strategic voting
simply because he was an astute politician. Given the centrality of
the English Civil War to colonial revolutionaries,17 however, the
fate of the English justices and tribunals that decided Ship-Money
probably explains at least in part Marshall’s reticence to challenge
Jeffersonian constitutional presumptions until supporters of a
Federalist/National Republic/Whig program had greater
influence in the national government.18
I. THE CASE
Ship-Money arose out of the quarrels between King Charles
I and Parliament that precipitated the English Civil War.19
Charles I dissolved Parliament in 1629 because he believed
members were intruding on the Royal prerogative. This decision
proved problematic. The main source of royal funding was the
subsidy, which could only be voted on by Parliament. In 1634,
Charles attempted to do a workabout by claiming the kingdom
was threatened by pirates and other nations in ways that made
necessary a demand that landowners supply the royal treasury
with the money to build ships. John Hampden and other
prominent political actors refused to pay the tax. They were
arrested and brought before the combined King’s Bench and
Court of Exchequer.
The special tribunal sustained the royal levy by an 8–4 vote.
Although nine of the twelve justices in their seriatim opinions
maintained that such exactions were constitutional, Sir Humphrey
Davenport voted against conviction because of a technical defect
in the writ. The primary issue before the court was whether the
King had acted legally. In declaring the Ship-Money levy illegal,
the dissenting justices implicitly or explicitly took the position that
16. See Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and
Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 229 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were
the ‘Great’ Marshall Court Decisions, 87 VA . L. REV. 1111 (2001); Jack Knight & Lee
Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 87, 95 (1996).
17. See KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE COUSINS’ WARS: RELIGION, POLITICS, CIVIL
WARFARE, AND THE TRIUMPH OF ANGLO-AMERICA (1999).
18. See Graber, supra note 12; Klarman, supra note 16.
19. For the information in this paragraph and a good background on English
constitutional politics in the seventeenth century, see 1 MARK A. GRABER & HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2015); CHRISTOPHER
HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 1603–1714 (1961).
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courts of law could find that the King had acted illegally. The
justices were not compelled to rule on whether courts could
maintain Parliament had acted illegally. Parliament, being
dissolved, had not acted at all. Nevertheless, at least three
opinions made clear that, had Parliament attempted to interfere
with the King’s effort to raise money to defend the kingdom, the
justices would have declared that effort illegal.
The central conclusion of the majority opinions, as expressed
in a previous letter to the King when Charles I asked for an
advisory opinion, was that “when the good and safety of the
kingdom in general is concerned . . . , your majesty is the sole
judge of the danger, and when and how the same is to be
prevented and avoided.”20 The King was authorized to determine
whether the realm was imperiled. Sir John Finch maintained, “the
king is sole judge of the danger, and whether it be imminent.”21
“[T]he danger being certified by his majesty,” Sir Humphrey
Davenport asserted, “I hold it not traversable.”22 Once the King
determined the realm was imperiled, the King was authorized to
adopt whatever means would best defend the realm. Some justices
grounded this conclusion in pragmatism. Sir Francis Weston
stated, “Will you have forces on both sides, and restrain the king
to his power by parliament, which may be so dilatory, that the
kingdom may be lost in the mean time?”23 The more common
claim was that royal power was rooted in sovereignty. Sir Robert
Berkley spoke of the “regal power to command provision (in case
of necessity) of means from the subjects, to be adjoined to the
king’s own means for the defense of the commonwealth.”24
These royal powers could not be controlled by Parliament.
Although Parliament had not passed a statute forbidding the
Ship-Money levy, several opinions by justices in the majority
made clear that courts would declare such a measure illegal. Finch
described at length the constitutional limits on parliamentary
efforts to tame royal power.
Acts of parliament may take away flowers and ornaments of
the crown, but not the crown itself; they cannot bar a
succession, nor can they be attained by them, and acts that bar
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

In the Case of Ship-Money, 3 Howell’s State Trials at 844.
Id. at 1219 (opinion of Finch, J.).
Id. at 1213 (opinion of Davenport, J.).
Id. at 1075 (opinion of Weston, J.).
Id. at 1099 (opinion of Berkley, J.).
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them or possession are void. No act of parliament can bar a
king of his regality, as that no lands should hold of him; or bar
him of the allegiance of his subjects; or the relative on his part,
as trust and power to defend his people: therefore acts of
parliament to take away his royal power in the defence of his
kingdom, are void . . . ; they are void acts of parliament, to bind
the kind not to command the subjects, their persons and goods,
and I say their money too: for no acts of parliament make any
difference.25

Two justices explicitly agreed with this declaration of
constitutional limits on parliamentary power to interfere with
regal prerogatives. Davenport wrote, “if an act of parliament
should be made to restrain such a charge on the subjects in case
of necessity, it would be felo de se, and so void, for it would destroy
the regalejus.”26 Sir George Vernon insisted, “a statute derogatory
from the prerogative doth not bind the king; and the king may
dispense with any law in cases of necessity.”27 No other majority
opinion discussed the status of laws that trenched on the royal
sovereignty, but other justices made assertions of royal power,
connected with sovereignty, that implicitly indicated that
parliament did not have the unlimited lawmaking authority that
Blackstone celebrated a century later. Sir Robert Berkley
described Parliament as “but a Concilium . . . ; the king may call
it, prorogue it, dissolve it, at his pleasure; and whatsoever the king
doth therein, is always to be taken as just and necessary.”28
The three justices who maintained the tax was illegal did not
rely on Blackstonian notions of parliamentary sovereignty. Those
dissents were guided by the principle that the king lacked the
specific power to tax without an act of Parliament. Sir George
Crooke maintained, “It is against the common law of the land,
which gives a man a freedom and property in his goods and
estates, that it cannot be taken from him, but by his consent in
specie, as in parliament, or by his particular assent.”29 Sir John
Denham agreed that “The king’s majesty being of a corporate
capacity, can neither take any lands or goods from any of his
subjects, but by and upon a judgment on record.”30 No judge in

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1235 (opinion of Finch, J.).
Id. at 1215 (opinion of Davenport, J.).
Id. at 1125 (opinion of Berkley, J.).
Id. at 1101 (opinion of Hutton, J.).
Id. at 1129 (opinion of Crooke, J.).
Id. at 1201 (opinion of Denham, J.).
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the dissent asserted a more general parliamentary supremacy. Sir
Richard Hutton, after observing that “this power of assessing of
money, being a great charge, cannot by the law at this day, unless
in time of actual war, be imposed upon the people [but] by act of
parliament,”31 then insisted that Parliament was not omniscient.
He continued, “if an act of parliament should enact that he should
not defend the kingdom, that the king should have no aid from his
subjects to defend the kingdom, these acts would not bind,
because they would be against natural reason.”32
The opinions in Ship-Money demonstrate that Blackstone’s
Commentaries described practice in mid-eighteenth century
England and not time-honored practices or even the practice
before the English Civil War. The justices in the majority that
discussed judicial review located sovereignty in the King. They
asserted a power to ignore legislation inconsistent with that
sovereignty. The justices in the dissent, less clearly, indicated that
the Common Law had devised a line between royal power and
parliamentary power. Parliament was supreme within that limited
jurisdiction. A royal edict that taxed people was an illegal
intrusion on parliamentary power (not sovereignty) and could be
so declared by the courts. For the same reasons, the dissenting
opinions indicated that Parliament, in turn, could not trench on
matters the Common Law entrusted to the King, such as the
defense of the kingdom in real emergencies.
II. SHIP-MONEY AND SOVEREIGNTY
Ship-Money offers interesting variations on and an
alternative to the connection between judicial power and
sovereignty. Judicial review in the United States, Whittington
notes, was initially grounded in the notion that the people are
sovereign. The lack of judicial review in the United Kingdom,
Blackstone points out, is grounded in the notion that Parliament
is sovereign (p. 41). The justices in the Ship-Money majority who
declared that courts could ignore laws inconsistent with the royal
prerogative grounded judicial authority in the notion that the
King was sovereign. The justices who believed the King had acted
illegally, by comparison, did not ground judicial authority on
parliamentary sovereignty or any other notion of sovereignty.
31. Id. at 1191 (opinion of Hutton, J.).
32. Id. at 1195 (opinion of Hutton, J.).
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Instead, they emphasized Common Law understandings similar
to those James Otis relied on during the 1760s when protesting
general warrants.
Those Americans who defended judicial review immediately
after the Constitution was drafted insisted that popular
sovereignty justified the judicial power to declare laws
unconstitutional. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 declared:
“Nor does this conclusion” that courts have the power to declare
legislation unconstitutional
by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people
is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be
governed by the latter rather than the former.33

St. George Tucker, in his American edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, reached the same conclusion. “[I]n America,” he
pointed out, “the constitutions, both of the individual states, and
of the federal government, being acts of the people, and not of the
government . . . the legislature can possess, no power, or
obligation over the other branches of government, in any case,
where the principles of the Constitution, may be in any degree
infringed by an acquiescence under the authority of the legislative
department.”34 John Marshall adopted this popular sovereign
justification for judicial review in Marbury v. Madison. The first
premise of his opinion was “That the people have an original right
to establish for their future government, such principles as in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis,
on which the whole American fabric has been erected.”35
Judicial power in the United Kingdom is as rooted in a theory
of sovereignty. Blackstone invoked parliamentary sovereignty
when denying the power of judicial or other institutions to declare
unconstitutional acts of Parliament. His Commentaries
maintained,
The power of parliament . . . is so transcendent and absolute
33. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS 467–68 (1961).
34. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES AND
REFERENCES TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS; OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 91 n.20 (1803).
35. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
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that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons without
any bounds . . . . It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority
in the making, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and
expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible
denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military,
maritime, or crime; this being the place where that absolute
despotic power,36 which must, in all governments, reside
somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these
kingdoms.37

This conception of parliamentary sovereign explains the English
judicial practice of ultra vires. Courts in the United Kingdom may
strike down administrative and executive decisions that they
conclude are not warranted by parliamentary legislation, but they
have no power to strike down legislative actions they believe
inconsistent with the English Constitution.38
The justices in the Ship-Money majority inverted
Blackstone’s analysis of judicial power and sovereignty. Rather
than locate sovereignty in Parliament, the justices located
sovereignty in the King. Sir John Finch declared, “Certainly there
was a king before a parliament, for how else could there be an
assembly of king, lords and commons? And then what sovereignty
was there in the kingdom but this?”39 Three conclusions followed
from this assertion of regal sovereignty. First, the King had the
power to determine when the kingdom was in sufficient danger to
require revenue to be collected without parliamentary consent.
Finch maintained, “the law that hath given the interest and
sovereignty of defending and governing the kingdom to the king,
doth also give the king power to charge his subjects for the
necessary defence and good thereof.”40 Second, judges could
strike down any parliamentary enactment that interfered with this
sovereign prerogative. As noted above, Finch’s opinion insisted,
“No act of parliament can bar a king of his regality, as that no

36. At this point in his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, Tucker added a
footnote stating, “In the United States this absolute power is not delegated to the
government: it remains with the people . . .”; TUCKER, supra note 34, at 160 n.21.
37. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 156
(1765).
38. For a good discussion of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial power in the
United Kingdom, see Lori Ringhand, Fig Leaves, Fairy Tales, and Constitutional
Foundations: Debating Judicial Review in Britain, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865
(2005).
39. Ship-Money, 3 Howell’s State Trials at 1226 (opinion of Finch, J.).
40. Id.
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lands should hold of him; or bar him of the allegiance of his
subjects; or the relative on his part, as trust and power to defend
his people: therefore acts of parliament to take away his royal
power in the defence of his kingdom, are void.”41 Third, royal
edicts were the law of the land. Berkley declared, “The law is of
itself an old and trusty servant of the king’s; it is his instrument or
means which he useth to govern his people by.—I never read or
heard, that Lex was Rex, but it is common and most true, that Rex
is Lex.”42
The dissenting opinions in Ship-Money did not ground
judicial power to strike down a regal act on a theory of
parliamentary or any other form of sovereignty. Hutton rejected
both parliamentary and royal sovereignty when he insisted that
the law of the land forbade kings from raising revenue without
parliamentary consent and forbade Parliament from interfering
with royal efforts to defend the kingdom.43 Instead, the dissents
appear to have grounded judicial authority in Common Law
practice. Parliamentary “sovereignty” was limited to those
matters the Common Law and traditional practice entrusted to
the national legislature. Royal sovereignty was limited to those
matters the Common Law and traditional practice entrusted to
the King. The judiciary, the dissenting opinions in Ship-Money
implied, determined how the common law and traditional practice
balanced power between Parliament and the King.
The dissenting opinions in Ship-Money cast new light on the
debate over whether Bonham’s Case belongs in the canon of
judicial review. Conventional wisdom regarded Bonham’s Case as
an important precedent for colonial calls for and early state
exercises of judicial power.44 A revisionist literature developed in
the mid-twentieth century suggesting that Coke’s claim that “the
common law will controul Acts of Parliament”45 is an assertion
about principles of statutory interpretation rather than about the
structure of the legal hierarchy.46 James Otis was inventing a new
tradition rather than reviving earlier practice, in this view, when
41. Id. at 1235.
42. Id. at 1098 (opinion of Berkley, J.).
43. See id. at 1191 (opinion of Hutton, J.).
44. See Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 30, 61–68 (1926).
45. Bonham’s Case, 77 English Reports at 652.
46. See J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 35 (1955). Whittington takes this view (p. 40).
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he cited Bonham’s Case for the proposition that “the acts of
Parliament against natural equity are void”47 and called on courts
to ignore legislation authorizing writs of assistance. The
revisionist literature seems plausible because few instances
appear to exist where English judges based decisions on
constitutional norms. If Bonham’s Case is an extreme outlier on a
traditional reading, then the traditional reading may be wrong.
The Ship-Money dissents provide a missing link between
Bonham’s Case and Otis’ claim that “An act against the
constitution is void,”48 suggesting far greater continuity between
English fundamental law jurisprudence of the seventeenth
century and colonial fundamental law jurisprudence of the
eighteenth century than acknowledged by Bonham’s Case
revisionists. Crooke’s claim in his dissenting opinion that the ShipMoney excise “is against the common law of the land”49 echoes
both Bonham’s Case and Otis. Douglas Edlin details how many
English judges during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
remained faithful to this common law practice. Prominent judges,
he details, understood the “common law [as] on ongoing
enterprise of human reason, conceived as practical, ‘artificial’
reason. So any law that conflicts with reason controverts the
common law.”50 Several important Supreme Court opinions in the
early republic continued this fundamental law practice. Justice
Samuel Chase, in Calder v. Bull, asserted that “general principles
of law and reason” justified striking down legislation inconsistent
with “free republican governments.”51 Chief Justice Marshall
insisted that “general principles which are common to our free
institutions” provided an alternate ground for his ruling in
Fletcher v. Peck that states could not rescind land grants.52 Justice
William Johnson based his concurring opinion in that case on “the
reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws
even on the deity.”53

47. JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED
72 (1764).
48. 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 525 (1865) (quoting Otis).
49. Ship-Money, 3 Howell’s State Trials at 1129 (opinion of Crooke, J.).
50. DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, JUDGES AND UNJUST LAWS: COMMON LAW
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77 (2008).
51. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388, 389 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
52. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810).
53. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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The Ship-Money opinions suggest two paths to the American
practice of judicial review. The first runs through the majority
opinions in Ship-Money to Blackstone to Federalist 78 and
Marbury v. Madison. This path treats judicial review as protecting
sovereign power, whether that sovereign be the King, the national
legislature or the people. Judicial review maintains the commands
of the sovereign power against any institution that implicitly
transgresses that authority. The second path runs through
Bonham’s Case to the dissenting opinions in Ship-Money to James
Otis to the Chase opinion in Calder and the judicial opinions in
Fletcher. This path treats judicial review as protecting the
fundamental law of a regime, regime principles that may or may
not be written down in a constitutional text. Judicial review
maintains longstanding fundamental principles against transient
efforts to challenge those norms. Both paths continue to structure
American constitutionalism. Robert McCloskey’s classic The
American Supreme Court speaks of “the devotion of Americans
to both popular sovereignty and fundamental law.”54
III. SHIP-MONEY AND THE PRACTICE
OF JUDICIAL POWER
Ship-Money teaches as important if not more important
lessons about the practice of judicial power. While far more
research is necessary, English constitutional history suggests that
the United Kingdom did not adopt parliamentary supremacy
because, after centuries of contemplation, crucial English elites
became convinced of the theoretical virtues of that allocation of
constitutional authority. The English courts chose the wrong side
in the English Civil War. Seventeenth-century English
revolutionaries identified courts with the royal power the justices
attempted to preserve. As Parliament struggled to tame royal
power, part of the taming was also a taming of a court system
perceived as a natural ally of royal power. Henry Parker’s The
Case of Shipmoney, published in 1640,55 was one of the first
documents in English constitutional history to champion
54. ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 8 (6th ed., 2016).
McCloskey thought judges responsible for upholding the fundamental law commitments
of democratic constitutionalism and elected officials responsible for upholding the popular
sovereignty commitment of democratic constitutionalism. Id. at. 6–8. As discussed,
however, judicial review reflects both commitments.
55. HENRY PARKER, THE CASE OF SHIPMONY BRIEFLY DISCOURSED, ACCORDING
TO THE GROUNDS OF LAW, POLICY, AND CONSCIENCE (1976) [1640].
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parliamentary supremacy.56 Had the justices ruled against Charles
I, the course of English constitutional history might have changed.
The rise of parliamentary supremacy in England adds an
important codicil to Professor Ran Hirschl’s theory of hegemonic
preservation. Hirschl observes that courts gain power in many
regimes when weakened majority coalitions have reason to
empower the judiciary as a bulwark against rising threats to their
rule. “[W]hen their policy preferences have been, or are likely to
be, increasingly challenged in majoritarian decision-making
arenas,” he maintains, “elites that possess disproportionate access
to, and influence over, the legal arena may initiate a constitutional
entrenchment of rights and judicial review in order to transfer
power to supreme courts.”57 Jefferson’s observation in 1801 that
“the Federalists have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold . . .
and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be
beaten down and erased”58 could have been said of a great many
regimes, including Stuart England, with only a change in the
proper nouns. Ship-Money highlights how one practical problem
with hegemonic preservation is that rising political forces will
identify courts with the partisan forces that have empowered the
judiciary. If those hegemons are toppled too quickly, the court
may be toppled as well. Sometimes, as in contemporary Poland,
the new regime replaces the old justices with newer justices allied
with the regime.59 The parliamentarians who triumphed in the
English Civil War, recognizing the historical alliance of judges
with the Crown, chose to abandon judicial review entirely, at least
judicial review of parliamentary legislation. The benefits of
hegemonic preservation, the Stuart and other examples suggest,
may be transient. The cost to the initial hegemons may be far
more significant.
Ship-Money helps explain the rise of judicial review in the
United States. Scholars generally agree that Federalists were
committed to increasing executive power, with disputes largely
over the degree to which Federalists wanted a stronger executive
than their anti-Federalist rivals.60 A strengthened judiciary, the
56. See Michael Mendle, The Ship Money Case, the Case of Shipmoney, and the
Development of Henry Parker’s Parliamentary Absolutism, 32 HIST. J. 513 (1989).
57. HIRSCHL, supra note 15, at 12.
58. 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (1902) (in
a letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, December 19, 1804).
59. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019).
60. For the most recent entry in this debate, see ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST
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English experience taught the framers, went hand-in-hand with a
strengthened judiciary. The Virginia Plan proposed a council of
revision composed of executive and judicial branch officials
authorized to reject federal legislation.61 That Council was
rejected, but Federalists understood courts as far more closely
allied with executive power than with legislative power. Federalist
78 indicated that courts would be toothless unless their decisions
met with executive approval. Hamilton famously stated that the
judiciary “may be truly said to have neither FORCE nor WILL,
but merely judgment,” to which he added the less well-known
point: “and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of judgment.”62
Whittington’s Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy
details the special relationship between courts and executives
throughout American history. That work details how
“[p]residents and political leaders have generally preferred that
the Court take the responsibility for securing constitutional
fidelity.”63 Presidents in times of normal constitutional politics
“place like-minded judges on the bench”64 as useful means for
“regime elaboration and enforcement,”65 particularly “against
constitutional outliers”66 in states controlled by factions that are
in the national minority. Presidents who confront a hostile
Congress may find promoting judicial power the lesser of two
evils. Whittington points out: “In a hostile political environment,
the law and the judiciary may be the best defense that a president
has.”67 Clashes between the White House and the Marble Palace
tend to occur only during those rare moments in history when a
new coalition has taken control of the elected branches of
government, but the older justices have not yet left the bench.68
Repugnant Laws tells the story of a chastened court that
learned the political lesson of Ship-Money. Supreme Court
REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2014).
61. See 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
21 (rev. ed., 1966).
62. HAMILTON, MADISON & JAY, supra note 29, at 465.
63. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:
THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY XI (2007).
64. Id. at 87.
65. Id. at 117.
66. Id. at 105
67. Id. at 166–167.
68. See id. at XI.
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justices in the United States from John Marshall to John Roberts
have generally avoided tangling with powerful forces in American
politics. Whittington points out, “Through . . . low-profile and
routine cases, the Court has established itself as a constitutional
actor on the national stage” (p. 294). The justices when wielding
judicial power in more high-profile and extraordinary cases have
been supported by powerful officials whose power, more often
than not, proved more enduring than that of Charles I. “When the
Court intervenes to vindicate . . . principles against an errant
legislature,” Repugnant Laws concludes, “it is often doing the
political work that political leaders want it to do” (p. 314). This
may not be the heroic judiciary imagined by Ronald Dworkin69
and sought by the Ship-Money majority, but what Whittington
brilliantly describes is the judicial reality of a tribunal that has
survived and thrived for more than two hundred years.

69. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69–71 (1985) (describing the
Supreme Court as the “forum of principle”).
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